INCREASING DOMESTIC NUCLEAR MANUFACTURING CAPACITY: THE EASY WAY
THE PAST
In December of 1957 the first attempt at a commercial nuclear power reactor came online. Shippingport took its lineage directly from the naval reactors spearheaded by Admiral Rickover and was built in only four and a half years. The reactor extensively leveraged military resources and had many unique design choices. While this made it technically not a commercial success, it paved the way for Yankee Row in 1960, the first profitable power reactor, which was built in only two years. These two reactors proved the viability of terrestrial nuclear power, and showcased the need for a professional standard to be used in the design and construction of nuclear components. In 1963 the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) addressed this need with the release of Section III of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC), titled “Nuclear Vessels”. Several years after this the N-stamp certification was created, allowing manufacturers to prove they could fabricate nuclear-grade components in conformance with Section III. This certification birthed the U.S. nuclear components industry and became the global standard for proving nuclear manufacturing quality.
Figure 1: The number of new ASME N-stamps issued each year, from 1990 to 2019
Any firm that wants to sell nuclear components must provably adhere to Section III, and all Safety Related (SR) Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) must be “N-stamped”. This makes records of N-stamp obtention and retention excellent data for tracking nuclear manufacturing health. A 2020 Sandia National Labs report analyzing the global trends of N-stamp certifications confirmed a steep decline in the number of new N-stamps issued in the U.S. and Canada starting in 1992. This was due to a contraction of the domestic nuclear industry, a situation that took place for a number of reasons, all of which are out of the scope of this blog post. The key takeaway is that this loss of certification makes it difficult to manufacture nuclear energy plants domestically.
THE PRESENT
Vogtle Units 3 and 4 were cast as the vanguard of a new nuclear renaissance, the moment the U.S. would reclaim its crown in nuclear energy. The late 2000s carried high expectations: a more navigable regulatory environment, a robust pre-2008 construction base, advanced reactor designs meant to reassure the public, and the promise of standardized plants all seemed poised to deliver cost savings and renewed momentum. Yet many of these supposed green-flags were nothing but red herrings. Vogtle quickly revealed what three decades of dormancy had eroded, most notably, nuclear-experienced EPCs, resilient supply chains, efficient contracting, and disciplined capital deployment. Adding to this, the path for suppliers to enter the nuclear market is steep: obtaining an ASME N-stamp demands years of preparation, heavy investment in quality systems, and repeated audits, all before a single component can be delivered. After Fukushima, annual N-stamp issuances collapsed to fewer than four, a clear sign that without consistent demand, supply chains cannot maintain nuclear capability. If obtaining and maintaining an N-stamp is overly burdensome, it will be one of the first activities targeted for cost cutting when the market tightens. This is especially true for companies where nuclear is not their primary business, which describes most nuclear suppliers. Adverse conditions will always threaten nuclear: construction costs can spiral, and natural gas can undercut prices. To withstand those pressures, the industry must reduce the “activation energy” required for suppliers to participate. By lowering that barrier, nuclear ensures that when headwinds come, decades of hard-earned capacity and knowledge does not vanish from the marketplace.
THE FUTURE
Growing the domestic nuclear manufacturing base using current methodologies will be too slow. Already demand is outstripping supply and the global market could not provide all the components required to build today what has been planned for the next 10 years. This issue has been flagged by many, including EPRI in their list of near-term supply chain actions for nuclear. They cite several tasks, including establishing nuclear-grade supplier development programs, reducing auditing burden, and expanding accessibility to COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) components. It is the last of these that is the most eminently scalable in the near future. Nuclear manufacturing does not exist in a silo and there are several adjacent industries that, with some incentivizing and a streamlined platform, could become suppliers. In one instance, by leveraging 10 CFR 50.69, Southern Nuclear was able to procure a replacement chilled-water pump for roughly $39,000 and a 12-19 week lead time. This is compared to nearly $200,000 and 38 weeks under the traditional nuclear safety-related pathway. Savings of this order, replicated across hundreds of low-safety-significant components, illustrate just one way how the industry can responsibly expand its supplier pool and unlock substantial cost and schedule advantages without compromising safety.
The current fleet is in dire need of components now, not in five years, and this will only compound as their licenses continue to get extended and new nuclear builds begin to compete for capacity. We must get creative while still adhering to the rigorous spirit of quality that has given the U.S. nuclear industry such a sterling reputation. Right now we are building a suite of tools that will help nuclear stakeholders, new and old, optimize their supply chains for the future. The nuclear industry is putting out an all-hands-on-deck call right now, and Anubis is answering it.